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I. INTRODUCTION
As white settlers began to arrive in increasing numbers in the West, trea-
ties were negotiated between the United States and resident Indian tribes.
In those treaties a reservation was usually reserved as a permanent home-
land for the tribe. One such reservation was the Skokomish Indian Reser-
vation. It was established by the 1855 Treaty of Point No Point2 ("Treaty")
at the mouth of the Skokomish River in Washington State. The last six
miles of the Skokomish River ("River") flow through the Reservation into
Puget Sound's Hood Canal. In 1930, the City of Tacoma began operation
of its Cushman Project, an unlicensed hydroelectric project several miles
above the reservation. The Project diverts nearly all the flow of the North
Fork of the Skokomish River and sends it through a penstock to an on-
reservation powerhouse on Hood Canal. As a result, only a trickle of water
flows through the River's North Fork, and only 40 percent of the original
1. Mason D. Morisset is the senior member of Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & McGaw, a profes-
sional services corporation in Seattle, Washington, and has been an active litigator for 37 years primar-
ily in the area of natural resource litigation. He received his B.A. from Lewis and Clark College in
1963, an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Washington in 1965, and his J.D. from the
University of California at Berkeley in 1968. He has successfully argued numerous appellate court
cases, including three cases before the Supreme Court, and has lectured at more than 100 CLE seminars
and symposia.
2. Treaty ofPoint No Point (Jan. 26, 1855), 12 Stat. 933.
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mainstem River flow now passes through the Reservation. This lack of
water, claims the Tribe, devastated fish runs, seriously diminished the
Tribe's ability to fish in the River basin on and off the Reservation, and
severely damaged the Reservation.
In 1999, the Skokomish Indian Tribe ("Tribe") sued Tacoma Public
Utilities ("Tacoma") and the United States in District Court for the Western
District of Washington. The Tribe sought monetary damages under federal,
state and common law for destruction of the Tribe's fishing rights and
property caused by Tacoma's project. The Tribe's monetary claims in-
cluded allegations of interference with the Tribe's federally reserved water
rights and individual members' civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court, on several summary judgment motions, dismissed all
Tribal and individual claims. Despite relevant Treaty language and evi-
dence of circumstances surrounding creation of the Reservation, the court
also found that the Tribe had no reserved water rights for fishing purposes.
It held that the Cushman Project's removal of nearly half the flow of the
River water did not implicate reserved water rights because there was
enough rainfall in Western Washington for crop production. The district
court also dismissed the Tribe's § 1983 claims. The Tribe appealed from
the district court's dismissal of all claims on summary judgment.
On June 3, 2003, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel upheld the district
court, with one member dissenting. Upon motion, the Court granted the
Tribe's petition for rehearing en banc. On March 9, 2005, a majority of six
of the en banc panel of eleven issued an opinion that dismissed all of the
Tribe's monetary claims against Tacoma and some claims against the
United States.3 Five judges issued two partially concurring and dissenting
opinions. Although the three-judge panel did not address the reserved wa-
ter rights issue, this first en banc opinion went on to hold that the Tribe pos-
sessed no reserved water rights for fishing because fishing was not the pri-
mary purpose of the Reservation. Upon a request for an additional en banc
review the Court filed an amended opinion superseding the original en banc
opinion and deleting the original section on water rights.4
While acknowledging the Tribes' right to equitable relief against parties
who did not sign the Treaty ("non-signatory party"), the final en banc ma-
jority opinion barred the Tribe from monetary relief. The en banc majority
held that individual tribal members could not seek monetary relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of treaty-reserved fishing rights because treaty
3. Skokomish Tribe v. U.S., 401 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2005).
4. Skokomish Tribe v. U. S., 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005). The opinion was written by Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski, and concurred in by Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder, and Circuit Judges Pamela
Ann Rymer, Ronald M. Gould, Jay S. Bybee and Consuelo M. Callahan. A separate opinion by Circuit
Judge Susan M. Graber concurs in part and dissents in part, and is joined by Circuit Judges Harry Pre-
gerson, Richard A. Paez, and Marsha S. Berzon. A separate opinion by Circuit Judge Marsha S. Ber-
zon dissents in part, and is concurred in by Circuit Judges Harry Pregerson, Richard A. Paez, and
Johnnie B. Rawlinson. The court therefore divides 6:4:4, with five judges in various degrees of consent.
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rights are held only by the Tribe.5 State common law based claims were
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. 6 Thus, after 75 years of de-
stroyed fisheries, Reservation plundering, and river estuary damage, the
Tribe was denied any meaningful remedy. In a six to five majority the
Court ruled that the Tribe and its individual members had no remedy for
damages to rectify these longstanding wrongs. The United States could not
be sued under either the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Federal Power Act.
The City of Tacoma and Tacoma Public Utilities could not be sued under
the Treaty of Point No Point or the Civil Rights Act. Nor were state law
theories of trespass, nuisance, or inverse condemnation available. Even
though the licensing requirement of the Federal Power Act had been ig-
nored, no remedy was available.
Because there are many similar Indian Treaties involving numerous In-
dian Tribes, the Cushman case has potentially far reaching implications.
II. THE COURT BARS MONETARY RELIEF DESPITE CLEAR DAMAGE To
TREATY PROTECTED RIGHTS
The majority's decision has been soundly criticized even by other mem-
bers of the court.
There are hard issues in this case concerning the precise
import of several precedents concerning Indians' treaty-
protected rights, but the majority's simplistic approach
misses them all.7
In barring Tribal claims in the Cushman case, the Ninth Circuit departed
from clear Supreme Court precedent. In Oneida II, the United States Su-
preme Court allowed a tribe's federal common law claim for monetary
damages against a non-signatory party that had violated possessory aborigi-
nal rights protected by treaties.8 The Ninth Circuit followed Oneida H in
United States v. Pend Oreille Public Utility District No. 1, 9 by allowing the
Kalispell Tribe to seek money damages against a public utility in a trespass
setting. Sister circuits follow the principles established in Oneida I, which
like Oneida II also recognized a federal cause of action for violation of a
tribe's federal possessory rights. 10
5. Id. at 515.
6. Id. at 516.
7. Id. at 523 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
8. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) ("Oneida I1"); Treaty of Fort
Harmar (Jan. 9, 1789) 7 Stat. 33; Treaty of Canandaigua (Nov. 11, 1794) 7 Stat. 44. Id. *
9. 28 F.3d 1544, 1550 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1994).
10. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) ("Oneida /F); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Company, 503 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1974) (court held federal jurisdiction
existed for tribe's federal common law suit for monetary damages against businesses that allegedly
destroyed trees on the reservation); Pueblo ofIsleta v. Universal Constructors, 570 F.2d 300 (10th Cir.
1978) (court held that federal common law claim for monetary damage existed for harm to on-
reservation property caused by off-reservation blasting).
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Additionally, precedent clearly establishes that damages are the preferred
and ordinary remedy, while injunctive relief is the extraordinary remedy."
Injunctive relief is thus proper only if monetary damages or other legal
remedies will not compensate plaintiffs for their injuries.
The en banc majority properly recognized that Indian treaties are the
"supreme law of the land," are self-enforcing, and are enforceable against
"non-contracting" parties. 12 Then, however, the majority inexplicably con-
flicted with binding law by holding that an Indian tribe has no federal
common law right to sue anyone, other than a treaty signatory, for damages
for violation of federal property rights reserved by treaty. "There is no ba-
sis for implying the right of action for damages that the Tribe seeks to as-
sert."
13
The dissent by Judge Berzon noted the direct conflict of the majority's
opinion with the Supreme Court's holding in Oneida II, which upheld the
existence of the tribes' federal common law cause of action and allowed
monetary relief.14 Further, by barring monetary damages while accepting
injunctive relief, the majority completely reversed the universally recog-
nized principle that injunctive relief is extraordinary and only available
when damages are inadequate. 15 The Court's basis for an exception to this
general rule, where Indians or Indian tribes are plaintiffs, does not appear.
The majority also erroneously distinguished the Oneida II decision as
"not based on any treaty."' 6  However, Oneida II involved possessory
rights reserved by two treaties. 17 Moreover, the Court in Oneida I held:
Given the nature and source of the possessory rights of In-
dian tribes to their aboriginal lands, particularly when con-
firmed by treaty, it is plain that the complaint asserted a
[federal cause of action]. '
8
The majority also either overlooked or ignored settled, binding precedent
that treaty rights protect and reserve pre-existing aboriginal rights. 19 There
11. Contl. Airlines v. Intra Brokers, 24 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[flor equitable relief to
be appropriate, there must generally be no adequate legal remedy"); New Era Publications Intl. v. Henry
Holt and Co., 873 F.2d 576, 597 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The preference for damages over injunctive relief is a
corollary of the requirement of demonstrable injury."); Lawson v. Hill, 368 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir.
2004) ("[A]n injunction may be issued only in a case or class of cases where damages are deemed an
inadequate remedy.... [A]n injunction might be thought 'extraordinary' relief because damages are the
ordinary relief.").
12. Skokomish Tribe, 410 F.3d at 512.
13. Id. at 514.
14. Skokomish Tribe, 410 F.3d at 522 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
15. Skokomish Tribev. U. S., 410 F.3d at 516.
16. ld. at 514.
17. Oneida 11, supra n. 7.
18. 414 U.S. at 667 (emphasis added).
19. US. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); Bd. of Control of Flathead v. US., 832 F.2d 1127,
1131 (9th Cir. 1987).
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appears to be no difference between the cause of action and relief in
Oneida H and the cause of action and relief sought in the Cushman case.
Finally, the majority's ruling conflicts with Circuit precedent that recog-
nizes a cause of action by commercial fishers to recover monetary damages
against those who negligently despoil the waters and thus injure the fishers'
livelihoods. 20 Non-Indian fishers do not have treaties that are the supreme
law of the land. Yet the majority denies damages to Indian fishers, with all
of their attendant rights, while non-Indian fishers with no treaty are evi-
dently entitled to compensation for infringement of their rights.
III. INDIVIDUAL TRIBAL MEMBERS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION BUT ARE
BARRED MONETARY RELIEF UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The majority also eliminated any possibility that individual tribal mem-
bers could sue for damages to their treaty rights. In so doing, the Ninth
Circuit, once again, ignored Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. The
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Dion2' held that tribal
members can enforce treaty fishing rights. In so doing, the Court relied on
Winans, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kimball v. Callahan, and the Tenth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Felter22. As the Ninth Circuit held in
Kimball, "an individual Indian enjoys a right of use in tribal property de-
rived from the legal or equitable property right of the Tribe of which he is a
member., 23  Finally, binding law requires evaluating the adequacy of
monetary damages if a private cause of action exists for a violation of fed-
eral law.
Nonetheless, the majority opinion rejected the rule that individual tribal
members have a cause of action for violating treaty fishing rights.24 The
only cases on which the majority relied - Settler v. Lameer,25 and Whitefoot
v. United States, 26 _ were decided before Dion, Kimball, and Felter and did
not address rights against third parties. Instead, Settler and Whitefoot only
addressed whether the tribe, acting as a government, could regulate individ-
ual fishing rights.
Finally, the majority distinguished Kimball on grounds that the Klamath
Tribe had been terminated.27  The Circuit initially held that individual
20. Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Emerson G.M Diesel v. Alaskan Enter., 732
F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
21. 476 U.S. 734, 738 n. 4 (1986).
22. 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
23. 590 F.2d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255, 258 (W.D. Wash.
1925) ("The treaty was with the Tribe; but the right of taking fish at all places within the reservation,
and usual and accustomed grounds and stations outside the reservation, was plainly a right common to
the members of the tribe - a right to a common is the right of an individual of the community."); U.S. v.
Wash., 935 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1991).
24. Skokomish Tribe, 410 F.3d at 515.
25. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
26. 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
27. Skokomish Tribe, 410 F.3d at 515 n. 7.
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Klamaths had a cause of action for violation of treaty fishing and hunting
rights, before reaching the question of whether the Klamath Termination
Act divested those rights. Accordingly, a tribe's subsequent termination
has nothing to do with the existence of an individual Indian's cause of ac-
tion to enforce treaty fishing rights.
IV. THE ORIGINAL PANEL MAJORITY OPINION RELEGATES FISHING To A
"SECONDARY" PURPOSE OF THE RESERVATION WITHOUT ATTENDANT
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
The withdrawn "water rights" section of the original opinion28 is histori-
cally important and an insight into the thinking of at least some Ninth Cir-
cuit judges. Over the past 100 years, the Supreme Court developed a body
of law on the federally reserved water rights doctrine. This doctrine recog-
nizes that federal reserved rights in unappropriated water are impliedly cre-
ated when the federal government withdraws lands from the public domain
and reserves them for federal purposes. 29 Federally reserved rights attach
to water that is appurtenant to the reservation, such as water that flows
through the Reservation. The amount of water reserved is that amount nec-
essary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. 30 Although Congress sel-
dom expressly reserved water when setting aside Indian reservations, it
intended to satisfy the then-present and future needs.31
Additionally, the Supreme Court has affirmed the overriding importance
of fishing to Washington Indian Tribes at treaty time.32 The Supreme Court
and Ninth Circuit have held that "[fishing rights] were not much less neces-
sary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.,
33
The dissent recognizes that the majority opinion conflicts with binding
law by ranking reservation purposes to exclude fishing. The Ninth Circuit
has held, "We have never encountered difficulty in inferring that the Tribes'
traditional salmon fishing was necessarily included as one of [the] 'pur-
poses' [of the Reservation]."34 The Circuit also warned in Adair that the
cases of Cappaert v. United States and United States v. New Mexico are
"not directly applicable to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reservations"
because they apply to non-Indian public lands. 35 Nevertheless, the majority
used Cappaert and New Mexico to relegate fishing to a "secondary use"
28. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. US., 401 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2005). The redacted portions are
also reprinted in William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Regrets and the Case of the Cushman Dam, 35 Envtl.
L. 397 (2005).
29. See e.g. Winters v. US., 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); U. S. v. N.M, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
30. US. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1409 (9th Cir. 1983).
31. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
32. Wash. v. Passenger Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 664-68 (1979).
33. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1995); Blake v.
Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1981).
34. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546.
35. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1408.
[Vol. 27
THE CUSHMAN DAM CASE
without attendant reserved water rights. 36 In so doing it nullified reserved
water rights for fishing on an Indian reservation located at a river mouth
even though "[f]ishing was the most important food acquisition technique"
of the Tribe's predecessors, 37 and thus paved the way for obliterating re-
served water rights for fishing purposes for all tribes within the Circuit.
Relegating fishing to a secondary purpose conflicts with other Circuit
precedent. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton held that the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretation in New Mexico did not extend to Indians
since: (1) specific purposes of an Indian reservation were usually unarticu-
lated; (2) the general purpose -- providing a homeland for the Indians -- is a
broad one that must be liberally construed; and (3) the government created
reservations for the Indians, not on its own behalf.
3 8
There are additional reasons for not applying the majority's "secondary
purpose" rule to Indian reservations. Indian reservations were usually es-
tablished as economically self-sufficient homelands, which reserved greater
quantities of water than other federal land areas dedicated to preserving
natural resources.39
Until now neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever con-
cluded that an Indian and other reservations could not have more than one
primary purpose. 40  The majority in the Skokomish original decision at-
tempted to change that, finding that there is only one primary purpose of the
Skokomish Reservation, which is, ludicrously, agriculture.
V.THE REDACTED MAJORITY OPINION ESTABLISHED A NEW TEST FOR
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS THAT COLLIDED WITH BINDING LAW AND
CIRCUIT PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court in Washington v. Fishing Vessel Association upheld
the pre-eminent importance of fishing to the tribes when their reservations
were created, including on-reservation fishing (and thus on-reservation wa-
ter): "It is perfectly clear, however, that the Indians were vitally interested
in protecting their right to take fish at usually and accustomed places,
36. In fact, the majority opinion on the issue of reserved water rights was unnecessary. The major-
ity dismissed all Treaty-based claims against Tacoma. The Tribe's reserved water rights claim is a
Treaty-based claim. Ultimately, the Court simply excised Section II.B of the 1st Opinion in the
Amended Opinion.
37. U.S. v. Wash., 384 F.Supp. 312, 377 (W.D. Wash. 1974), afi'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
38. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42,47 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 581-85 (rev. ed., Lexis Law Publg. 1982).
40. NM, 438 U.S. at 698 ("Congress intended national forests to be reserved for only two pur-
poses") (emphasis added); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410 ("Neither Cappaert [cite omitted] nor New Mex-
ico[cite omitted] requires us to choose between [agriculture or hunting/fishing] or to identify a single
essential purpose which the parties to the 1864 Treaty intended the Klamath Reservation to serve.");
Walton, 647 F.2d at 48 (while recognizing that both "[p]roviding for a land-based agrarian society" and
"preservation of the tribe's access to fishing grounds" were reservation purposes).
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whether on or off the reservations. ' 41 Both the Skokomish Tribe and the
United States were parties in Fishing Vessel and the present case, which
accentuates the binding nature of Fishing Vessel.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has established a bedrock approach to
determining "primary purposes" that always: (1) requires "careful exami-
nation" of the reservation's organic document(s), legislative history, and
other evidence of circumstances leading to creation of the reservation; 42 (2)
applies Indian law canons of construction to the reservation's organic docu-
ments by interpreting ambiguities in favor of the Tribe and ascertaining the
parties' understanding at the time; 43 and (3) finds an "exclusive" on-
reservation fishing or hunting right, even when such rights-specific lan-
guage was absent from the reservation's organic document. 44 In Dion, the
Supreme Court held:
As a general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to
hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, unless such rights
were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified
by Congress. These rights need not be expressly men-
tioned in the treaty.45
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held in Walton that despite the omission
of the term "exclusive" in the reservation executive order, the order re-
served water rights appurtenant to the Colville Reservation for purposes of
(1) providing a land-based agrarian society, and (2) preserving access to
46fishing runs.
Nonetheless, the majority, in the redacted water rights section, disal-
lowed federal reserved water rights for fishing arguing that, unlike the case
of United States v. Adair, the fishing clause in the Treaty did not expressly
guarantee an "exclusive" right. The majority opinion thus clearly departed
from previous law by: (1) requiring that the term "exclusive" appear in the
fishing clause as a precondition to an on-reservation fishing purpose; (2)
41. 443 U.S. at 667.
42. See e.g. N.M, 438 U.S. at 701; Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-78. Prior Circuit rulings uniformly
followed the Supreme Court. See e.g. US. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 335-36 (9th
Cir. 1939); U.S. v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 325-27 (9th Cir. 1956); Walton, 647 F.2d at
47; San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Ariz., 668 F.2d 1093, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Anderson, 736
F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984); Bd. of Control ofFlathead v. U.S., 832 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1987);
Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1995).
43. See e.g. Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-78.
44. Menominee Tribe ofIndians v.US., 391 U.S. 404, 406 n. 2 (1968) (recognizing an "exclusive"
on-reservation hunting right despite the treaty's omission of that word). Subsequent alienation of some
Indian reservation lands to non-Indians allows the non-Indians to hunt on fee lands within the reserva-
tion. U.S. v. Mont., 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
45. Dion, 476 U.S. at 737 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also U.S. v. Wash. 384 F. Supp
at 332, n.12 ("[W]ithout exception, the United States Supreme Court has assumed that on reservation
fishing is exclusive and has interpreted and applied similar fishing clauses as though the word 'exclusive'
was expressly stated therein as in the Yakima treaty. Research has not disclosed any reported decision
to the contrary").
46. Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47-8.
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either ignoring or overlooking that Article 2 of the Treaty reserved to the
tribe "exclusive use" of its lands as a homeland, and such use included fish-
ing; and (3) relying on evidence developed long after creation of the reser-
vation, to the exclusion of evidence developed at Treaty time.47
The majority, in its stark departure from binding precedent, conducted no
"careful examination." Every Supreme Court case that has determined
primary reservation purposes, whether for an Indian reservation or other
federal reservation, conducted a "careful examination" of the organic reser-
vation documents, the legislative history, and evidence of the surrounding
circumstances.48
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority's decision in the Cushman Dam case has disturbing impli-
cations. The majority seems to say that it does not matter that the Indian
tribe was promised certain property rights in a treaty. There is really noth-
ing they can do about damage or destruction to such rights caused by a so-
called third party, such as the City of Tacoma. At least one respected
commentator has referred to the opinion as containing "sorry rulings" of
"calculated insolence., 49 But Professor Rodgers also notes, it is a wonder-
ful thing about judicial decision making "that minds can be changed upon
further reflection."50 Perhaps it will be so.
47. Treaty of Point No Point, supra n. 1 (Article 2 "reserved" to the Skokomish "for their exclusive
use [and occupation]" lands "situated at the head of Hood's Canal").
48. N.M, 438 U.S. at 701.
49. Rodgers, supra n. 27, at 409.
50. Id. at 409, n. 77.
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